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Abstract—The critical infrastructures of the nation including
the power grid and the communication network are highly
interdependent. Recognizing the need for a deeper understanding
of the interdependency in a multi-layered network, significant
efforts have been made by the research community in the last
few years to achieve this goal. Accordingly a number of models
have been proposed and analyzed. Unfortunately, most of the
models are over simplified and, as such, they fail to capture the
complex interdependency that exists between entities of the power
grid and the communication networks involving a combination of
conjunctive and disjunctive relations. To overcome the limitations
of existing models, we propose a new model that is able to
capture such complex interdependency relations. Utilizing this
model, we provide techniques to identify the K most vulnerable
nodes of an interdependent network. We show that the problem
can be solved in polynomial time in some special cases, whereas
for some others, the problem is NP-complete. We establish that
this problem is equivalent to computation of a fixed point of a
multilayered network system and we provide a technique for its
computation utilizing Integer Linear Programming. Finally, we
evaluate the efficacy of our technique using real data collected
from the power grid and the communication network that span
the Maricopa County of Arizona.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years there has been an increasing awareness
in the research community that the critical infrastructures of
the nation are closely coupled in the sense that the well being
of one infrastructure depends heavily on the well being of an-
other. A case in point is the interdependency between the elec-
tric power grid and the communication network. The power
grid entities, such as the SCADA systems that control power
stations and sub-stations, receive their commands through
communication networks, while the entities of communication
network, such as routers and base stations, cannot operate
without electric power. Cascading failures in the power grid,
are even more complex now because of the coupling between
power grid and communication network. Due to this coupling,
not only entities in power networks, such as generators and
transmission lines, can trigger power failure, communication
network entities, such as routers and optical fiber lines, can
also trigger failure in power grid. Thus it is essential that
the interdependency between different types of networks be
understood well, so that preventive measures can be taken to
avoid cascading catastrophic failures in multi-layered network
environments.
Recognizing the need for a deeper understanding of the
interdependency in a multi-layered network, significant efforts
have been made in the research community in the last few
years to achieve this goal [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8].
Accordingly a number of models have been proposed and
analyzed. Unfortunately, many of the proposed models are
overly simplistic in nature and as such they fail to capture
the complex interdependency that exists between power grid
and communication networks. In a highly cited paper [1], the
authors assume that every node in one network depends on one
and only one node of the other network. However, in a follow
up paper [2], the same authors argue that this assumption may
not be valid in the real world and a single node in one network
may depend on more than one node in the other network. A
node in one network may be functional (“alive”) as long as
one supporting node on the other network is functional.
Although this generalization can account for disjunctive
dependency of a node in the A network (say ai) on more
than one node in the B network (say, bj and bk), implying
that ai may be “alive” as long as either bi or bj is alive,
it cannot account for conjunctive dependency of the form
when both bj and bk has to be alive in order for ai to
be alive. In a real network the dependency is likely to be
even more complex involving both disjunctive and conjunctive
components. For example, ai may be alive if (i) bj and bk and
bl are alive, or (ii) bm and bn are alive, or (iii) bp is alive. The
graph based interdependency models proposed in the literature
[3], [4], [5], [9], [6], [7] including [1], [2] cannot capture
such complex interdependency between entities of multilayer
networks. In order to capture such complex interdependency,
we propose a new model using Boolean logic. Utilizing this
comprehensive model, we provide techniques to identify the
K most vulnerable nodes of an interdependent multilayered
network system. We show that the this problem can be solved
in polynomial time for some special cases, whereas for some
others, the problem is NP-complete. We also show that this
problem is equivalent to computation of a fixed point [10] and
we provide a technique utilizing Integer Linear Programming
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2to compute that fixed point. Finally, we evaluate the efficacy
of our technique using real data collected from power grid
and communication networks that span Maricopa County of
Arizona.
II. INTERDEPENDENCY MODEL
We describe the model for an interdependent network with
two layers. However, the concept can easily be generalized
to deal with networks with more layers. Suppose that the
network entities in layer 1 are referred to as the A type
entities, A = {a1, . . . , an} and entities in layer 2 are referred
to as the B type entities, B = {b1, . . . , bm}. If the layer 1
entity ai is operational if (i) the layer 2 entities bj , bk, bl
are operational, or (ii) bm, bn are operational, or (iii) bp
is operational, we express it in terms of live equations of
the form ai ← bjbkbl + bmbn + bp. The live equation for
a B type entity br can be expressed in a similar fashion
in terms of A type entities. If br is operational if (i) the
layer 1 entities as, at, au, av are operational, or (ii) aw, az
are operational, we express it in terms of live equations of
the form br ← asatauav + awaz . It may be noted that the
live equations only provide a necessary condition for entities
such as ai or br to be operational. In other words, ai or br
may fail independently and may be not operational even when
the conditions given by the corresponding live equations are
satisfied. A live equation in general will have the following
form: xi ←
∑Ti
j=1
∏tj
k=1 yj,k where xi and yj,k are elements
of the set A (B) and B (A) respectively, Ti represents the
number of min-terms in the live equation and tj refers to the
size of the j-th min-term (the size of a min-term is equal to the
number of A or B elements in that min-term). In the example
ai ← bjbkbl + bmbn + bp, Ti = 3, t1 = 3, t2 = 2, t3 = 1,
xi = ai, y2,1 = bm, y2,2 = bp.
We refer to the live equations of the form ai ← bjbkbl +
bmbn + bp also as First Order Dependency Relations, because
these relations express direct dependency of the A type entities
on B type entities and vice-versa. It may be noted however
that as A type entities are dependent on B type entities,
which in turn depends on A type entities, the failure of
some A type entities can trigger the failure of other A type
entities, though indirectly, through some B type entities. Such
interdependency creates a cascade of failures in multilayered
networks when only a few entities of either A type or B type
(or a combination) fails. We illustrate this with the help of
an example. The live equations for this example is shown in
table I.
Power Network Communication Network
a1 ← b1 + b2 b1 ← a1 + a2a3
a2 ← b1b3 + b2 b2 ← a1 + a3
a3 ← b1b2b3 b3 ← a1a2
a4 ← b1 + b2 + b3 −−
TABLE I: Live equations for a Multilayer Network
Entities Time Steps
t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
a1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
a2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
a3 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
a4 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
b1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
b2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
b3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
TABLE II: Time Stepped Cascade Effect for a Multilayer Network
Fig. 1: Cascading failures reach steady state after p time steps
As shown in table II, the failure of only one entity a1 at
time step t0 triggered a chain of failures that resulted in the
failure of all the entities of the network after by timestep t4.
A table entry of 1 indicates that the entity is “dead”. In this
example, the failure of a1 at t0 triggered the failure of b3 at
t1, which in turn triggered the failure of a3 at t2. The failure
of b3 at t1 was due to the dependency relation b3 ← a1a2
and the failure of a3 at t2 was due to the dependency relation
a3 ← b1b2b3. The cascading failure process initiated by failure
(or death) of a subset of A type entities at timestep t0, A0d and
a subset of B type entities B0d till it reaches its final steady
state is shown diagrammatically in figure 1. Accordingly, a
multilayered network can be viewed as a “closed loop” control
system. Finding the steady state after an initial failure in this
case is equivalent of computing the fixed point of a function
F(.) such that F(Apd ∪ Bpd) = Apd ∪ Bpd , where p represents
the number of steps when the system reaches the steady state.
We define a set of K entities in a multi-layered network
as most vulnerable, if failure of these K entities triggers the
failure of the largest number of other entities. The goal of
the K most vulnerable nodes problem is to identify this set of
nodes. This is equivalent to identifying A0d ⊆ A, B0d ⊆ B, that
maximizes |Apd∪Bpd |, subject to the constraint that |A0d∪B0d| ≤
K.
The dependency relations (live equations) can be formed
either after careful analysis of the multilayer network along the
lines carried out in [8], or after consultation with the engineers
of the local utility and internet service providers.
III. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY AND ALGORITHMS
Based on the number and the size of the min-terms in the
dependency relations, we divide them into four different cases
as shown in Table III. The algorithms for finding the K most
vulnerable nodes in the multilayer networks and computation
complexity for each of the cases are discussed in the following
four subsections.
Case No. of Min-terms Size of Min-terms
Case I 1 1
Case II 1 Arbitrary
Case III Arbitrary 1
Case IV Arbitrary Arbitrary
TABLE III: Equation Types for Dependency Relations
3A. Case I: Problem Instance with One Min-term of Size One
In this case, a live equation in general will have the follow-
ing form: xi ← yj where xi and yj are elements of the set A
(B) and B (A) respectively. In the example ai ← bj , xi = ai,
y1 = bj . It may be noted that a conjunctive implication of
the form ai ← bjbk can also be written as two separate
implications ai ← bj and ai ← bk. However, such cases are
considered in Case II and is excluded from consideration in
Case I. The exclusion of such implications implies that the
entities that appear on the LHS of an implication in Case I
are unique. This property enables us to develop a polynomial
time algorithm for the solution of the K most vulnerable node
problem for this case. We present the algorithm next.
Algorithm 1
Input: (i) A set S of implications of the form of y ← x,
where x, y ∈ A ∪B, (ii) An integer K.
Output: A set V ′ where |V ′| = K and V ′ ⊂ A ∪ B such
that failure of entities in V ′ at time step t0 results in failure
of the largest number of entities in A ∪ B when the steady
state is reached.
Step 1. We construct a directed graph G = (V,E), where
V = A ∪ B. For each implication y ← x in S, where x, y ∈
A ∪B, we introduce a directed edge (x, y) ∈ E.
Step 2. For each node xi ∈ V , we construct a transitive
closure set Cxi as follows: If there is a path from xi to some
node yi ∈ V in G, then we include yi in Cxi . It may be
recalled that |A|+ |B| = n+m. So, we get n+m transitive
closure sets Cxi , 1 ≤ i ≤ (n + m). We call each xi to be the
seed entity for the transitive closure set Cxi .
Step 3. We remove all the transitive closure sets which are
proper subsets of some other transitive closure set.
Step 4. Sort the remaining transitive closure sets Cxi ,
where the rank of the closure sets is determined by the
cardinality of the sets. The sets with a larger number of entities
are ranked higher than the sets with a fewer number of entities.
Step 5. Construct the set V ′ by selecting the seed entities
of the top K transitive closure sets. If the number of remaining
transitive closure sets is less than K (say, K′), arbitrarily select
the remaining entities.
Time complexity of Algorithm 1: Step 1 takes O(n+m+ |S|)
time. Step 2 can be executed in O((n+m)3) time. Step 3 takes
at most O((n+m)2) time. Step 4 sorts at most |S| entries, a
standard sorting algorithm takes O(|S| log |S|) time. Selecting
K entities in step 5 takes O(K) time. Since |S| ≤ n+m, hence
the overall time complexity is O((n + m)3)
Theorem 1. For each pair of transitive closure sets Cxi and
Cxj produced in step 2 of algorithm 1, either Cxi ∩ Cxj = ∅
or Cxi ∩ Cxj = Cxi or Cxi ∩ Cxj = Cxj , where xi 6= xj .
Proof: Consider, if possible, that there is a pair of transitive
closure sets Cxi and Cxj produced in step 2 of algorithm 1,
such that Cxi∩Cxj 6= ∅ and Cxi∩Cxj 6= Cxi and Cxi∩Cxj 6=
Cxj . Let xk ∈ Cxi ∩ Cxj . This implies that there is a path
from xi to xk (path1) as well as there is a path from xj to xk,
(path2). Since, xi 6= xj and Cxi∩Cxj 6= Cxi and Cxi∩Cxj =
Cxj , there is some xl in the path1 such that xl also belongs to
path2. W.l.o.g, let us consider that xl be the first node in path1
such that xl also belongs to path2. This implies that xl has
in-degree greater than 1. This in turn implies that there are two
implications in the set of implications S such that xl appears in
the L.H.S of both. This is a contradiction because this violates
a characteristic of the implications in Case I. Hence, our initial
assumption was wrong and the theorem is proven.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 gives an optimal solution for the
problem of selecting K most vulnerable entities in a multi-
layer network for case I dependencies.
Proof: Consider that the set V ′ returned by the algorithm is
not optimal and the optimal solution is VOPT . Let us consider
there is a entity xi ∈ A ∪ B such that xi ∈ VOPT \ V ′.
Evidently, (i) Cxi was either deleted in step 3 or (ii) |Cxi | is
less than the cardinalities of all the transitive closure sets with
seed entities xj ∈ V ′, because our algorithm did not select
xi. Hence, in both cases, replacing any entity xj ∈ V ′ by xi
reduces the total number of entities killed. Thus, the number
of dead entities by the failure of entities in VOPT is lesser than
that caused by the failure of the entities in V ′, contradicting
the optimality of VOPT . Hence, the algorithm does in fact
return the optimal solution.
B. Case II: Problem Instance with One Min-term of Arbitrary
Size
In this case, a live equation in general will have the
following form: xi ←
∏q
k=1 yj where xi and yj are elements
of the set A (B) and B (A) respectively, q represents the size
of min-term. In the example ai ← bjbkbl, q = 3, xi = ai,
y1 = bj , y2 = bk, y3 = bk.
1) Computational Complexity: We show that computation
of K most vulnerable nodes (K-MVN) in a multilayer network
is NP-complete in Case II. We formally state the problem next.
Instance: Given a set of dependency relations between
A and B type entities in the form of live equations xi ←∏q
k=1 yj , integers K and L.
Question: Is there a subset of A and B type entities of
size at most K whose “death” (failure) at time t0, triggers a
cascade of failures resulting in failures of at least L entities,
when the steady state is reached?
Theorem 3. The K-MVN problem is NP-complete.
Proof: We prove that the K-MVN problem is NP-complete
by giving a transformation for the vertex cover (VC) problem.
An instance of the vertex cover problem is specified by an
undirected graph G = (V,E) and an integer R. We want to
know if there is a subset of nodes S ⊆ V of size at most
R, so that every edge has at least one end point in S. From
an instance of the VC problem, we create an instance of the
4K-MVN problem in the following way. First, from the graph
G = (V,E), we create a directed graph G′ = (V,E′) by
replacing each edge e ∈ E by two oppositely directed edges
e1 and e2 in E′ (the end vertices of e1 and e2 are same as
the end vertices of e). Corresponding to a node vi in G′ that
has incoming edges from other nodes (say) vj , vk and vl, we
create a dependency relation (live equation) vi ← vjvkvl. We
set K = R and L = |V |. The corresponding death equation is
of the form v¯i ← v¯j + v¯k + v¯l (obtained by taking negation
of the live equation). We set K = R and L = |V |. It can now
easily be verified that if the graph G = (V,E) has a vertex
cover of size R iff in the created instance of K-MVN problem
death (failure) of at most K entities at time t0, will trigger a
cascade of failures resulting in failures of at least L entities,
when the steady state is reached.
2) Optimal Solution with Integer Linear Programming:
In this case, we can find and optimal solution to the K-
MVN problem using Integer Linear Programming (ILP). We
associate binary indicator variables xi (yi) to capture the state
of the entities ai (bi). xi (yi) is 1 when ai (bi) is dead and
0 otherwise. Since we want find the set of K entities whose
failure at time step t0 triggers cascading failure resulting in the
failure of the largest number of entities, the objective of the
ILP can be written as follows maximize
∑n
i=1 xi+
∑m
i=1 yi
It may be noted that the variables in the objective function
do not have any notion of time. However, cascading failure
takes place in time steps, ai triggers failure of bj at time
step t1, which in turn triggers failure of ak in time step t2
and so on. Accordingly, in order to capture the cascading
failure process, we need to introduce the notion of time into
the variables of the ILP. If the numbers of A and B type
entities are n and m respectively, the steady state must be
reached by time step n + m − 1 (cascading process starts at
time step 0, t0). Accordingly, we introduce n + m versions
of the variables xi and yi, i.e., xi[0], . . . , xi[n + m − 1] and
yi[0], . . . , yi[n+m−1]. To indicate the state of entities ai and
bi at times t0, . . . , tn+m−1. The objective of the ILP is now
changed to
maximize
n∑
i=1
xi[n + m− 1] +
m∑
i=1
yi[n + m− 1]
Subject to the constraint that no more than K entities can
fail at time t0.
Constraint 1:
∑n
i=1 xi[0] +
∑m
i=1 yi[0] ≤ K In order
to ensure that the cascading failure process conforms to
the dependency relations between type A and B entities,
additional constraints must be imposed.
Constraint 2: If an entity fails at time fails at time step p,
(i.e., tp) it should continue to be in the failed state at all time
steps t > p. That is xi(t) ≥ xi(t− 1),∀t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n+m− 1.
Same constraint applies to yi(t).
Constraint 3: The dependency relation (death equation)
a¯i ← b¯j+b¯k+b¯l can be translated into a linear constraint in the
following way xi(t) ≤ yj(t−1)+yk(t−1)+yl(t−1),∀t, 1 ≤
t ≤ n + m− 1.
The optimal solution to K-MVN problem for Case II can be
found by solving the above ILP.
C. Case III: Problem Instance with an Arbitrary Number of
Min-terms of Size One
A live equation in this special case will have the following
form: xi ←
∑q
j=1 yj where xi and yj are elements of the set
A (B) and B (A) respectively, q represents the number of min-
terms in the live equation. In the example ai ← bj + bk + bl,
q = 3, xi = ai, y1 = bj , y2 = bk, y3 = bl.
1) Computational Complexity: We show that a special
case of the problem instances with an arbitrary number
of min-terms of size one is same as the Subset Cover
problem (defined below), which is proven to be NP-
complete. We define Implication Set(A) to be the
set of all implications of the form ai ←
∑Ti
j=1 bj and
Implication Set(B) to be the set of all implications of the
form bi ←
∑Ti
j=1 aj . Now consider a subset of the set of
problem instances with an arbitrary number of min-terms
of size one where either Implication Set(A) = ∅
or Implication Set(B) = ∅. Let A′ =
{ai|ai is the element on the LHS of an implication}
in the Implication Set(A). The set B′ is defined
accordingly. If Implication Set(B) = ∅ then B′ = ∅. In
this case, failure of any ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ n type entities will not
cause failure of any bj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m type entities. Since an
adversary can cause failure of only K entities, the adversary
would like to choose only those K entities that will cause
failure of the largest number of entities. In this scenario, there
is no reason for the adversary to attack any ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ n type
entities as they will not cause failure of any bj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m
type entities. On the other hand, if the adversary attacks
K bj type entities, not only those K bj type entities will
be destroyed, some ai type entities will also be destroyed
due to the implications in the Implication Set(A). As
such the goal of the adversary will be to carefully choose
K bj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m type entities that will destroy the largest
number of ai type entities. In its abstract form, the problem
can be viewed as the Subset Cover problem.
Subset Cover Problem
Instance: A set S = {s1, . . . , sm}, a set S of m subsets of S,
i.e., S = {S1, . . . , Sr}, where Si ⊆ S, ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, integers
p and q.
Question: Is there a p element subset S′ of S (p < n) that
completely covers at least q elements of the set S? (A set S′ is
said to be completely covering an element Si,∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m
of the set S, if S′ ∩ Si = Si,∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.)
The set S in the subset cover problem corresponds to the
set B = {b1, . . . , bm}, and each set Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ r corresponds
to an implication in the ImplicationSet(A) and comprises of
the bj’s that appear on the RHS of the implication. The goal
of the problem is to select a subset B′′ of B that maximizes
the number of Si’s completely covered by B′′.
5Theorem 4. The Subset Cover problem is NP-complete.
Proof: We prove that the Subset Cover problem is NP-
complete by giving a transformation from the well known
Clique problem. It may be recalled that an instance of the
Clique problem is specified by a graph G = (V,E) and an
integer K. The decision question is whether or not a clique of
size at least K exists in the graph G = (V,E). We show that
a clique of size K exists in graph G = (V,E) iff the Subset
Cover problem instance has a p element subset S′ of S that
completely covers at least q elements of the set S.
From an instance of the Clique problem, we create an
instance of the Subset Cover problem in the following way.
Corresponding to every vertex vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n of the graph
G = (V,E) (V = {v1, . . . , vn}), we create an element
in the set S = {s1, . . . , sn}. Corresponding to every edge
ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we create m subsets of S, i.e., S =
{S1, . . . , Sm}, where Si corresponds to a two element subset
of nodes, corresponding to the end vertices of the edge ei. We
set the parameters p = K and q = K(K − 1)/2. Next we
show that in the instance of the subset cover problem created
by the above construction process, a p element subset S′ of
S exists that completely covers at least q elements of the set
S , iff the graph G = (V,E) has a clique of size at least K.
Suppose that the graph G = (V,E) has a clique of size
K. It is clear that in the created instance of the subset cover
problem, we will have K(K − 1)/2 elements in the set S,
that will be completely covered by a K element subset of
the set S. The K element subset of S corresponds to the set
of K nodes that make up the clique in G = (V,E) and the
K(K − 1)/2 elements in the set S corresponds to the edges
of the graph G = (V,E) that corresponds to the edges of
the clique. Conversely, suppose that the instance of the Subset
Cover problem has K element subset of S that completely
covers K(K−1)/2 elements of the set S. Since the elements
of S corresponds to the edges in G, in order to completely
cover K(K − 1)/2 edges, at least K nodes (elements of the
set S) will be necessary. As such, this set of K nodes will
constitute a clique in the graph G = (V,E).
2) Optimal Solution with Integer Linear Programming: If
the live equation is in the form xi ←
∑q
k=1 yj then the “death
equation” (obtained by taking negation of the live equation)
will be in the product form x¯i ←
∏q
j=1 y¯j . If the live equation
is given as ai ← bj +bk, then the death equation will be given
as a¯i ← b¯j b¯k.
By associating binary indicator variables xi and yi to
capture the state of the entities ai and bi, we can follow almost
identical procedure as in Case II, with only one exception.
It may be recalled that in Case II, the death equations such
as a¯i ← b¯j + b¯k was translated into a linear constraint
xi(t) ≤ yj(t−1)+yk(t−1),∀t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n+m−1. However
a similar translation in Case III, with death equations such as
a¯i ← b¯j b¯k, will result in a non-linear constraint of the form
xi(t) ≤ yj(t−1)yk(t−1),∀t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n+m−1. Fortunately,
a non-linear constraint of this form can be replaced a linear
constraint such as 2xi(t) ≤ yj(t − 1) + yk(t − 1),∀t, 1 ≤
t ≤ n+m− 1. After this transformation, we can compute the
optimal solution using integer linear programming.
D. Case IV: Problem Instance with an Arbitrary Number of
Min-terms of Arbitrary Size
1) Computational Complexity: Since both Case II and Case
III are special cases of Case IV, the computational complexity
of finding the K most vulnerable nodes in the multilayer
network in NP-complete in Case IV also.
2) Optimal Solution with Integer Linear Programming:
The optimal solution to this version of the problem can be
computed by combining the techniques developed for the
solution of the versions of the problems considered in Cases
II and III.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We applied our model to study multilayer vulnerability
issues in Maricopa County, the most densely populated county
of Arizona with approximately 60% of Arizonas population
residing in it. Specifically, we wanted to find out if some
regions of Maricopa County were more vulnerable to failure
than some other regions. The data for our multi-layered
network were obtained from different sources. We obtained
the data for the power network (network A) from Platts
(http://www.platts.com/). Our power network dataset consists
of 70 power plants and 470 transmission lines. Our communi-
cation network (network B) data were obtained from GeoTel
(http://www.geo-tel.com/). Our communication network data
consists of 2, 690 cell towers and 7, 100 fiber-lit buildings as
well as 42, 723 fiber links. Snapshots of our power network
data and communication network data are shown in figure 2. In
the power network snapshot of sub-figure(a), the orange mark-
ers show locations of powerplants while the yellow continuous
lines represent the transmission lines. In the communication
network snapshot of sub-figure (b) the pink markers show the
location of fiber-lit buildings, the orange markers show the
location of cell towers and the green continuous lines represent
the fiber links. In our dataset, ‘load’ in the Power Network is
divided into Cell towers and Fiber-lit buildings. Although there
exists various other physical entities which also draw electric
power and hence can be viewed as load to the power network,
as they are not relevant to our study on interdependency
between power and communication networks, we ignore such
entities. Thus in network A, we have the three types of Power
Network Entities (PNE’s) - Generators, Load (consisting of
Cell towers and Fiber-lit buildings) and Transmission lines
(denoted by a1, a2, a3 respectively). For the Communication
Network, we have the following Communication Network
Entities (CNE’s) - Cell Towers, Fiber-lit buildings and Fiber
links (denoted by b1, b2, b3 respectively). We consider the
Fiber-lit buildings as a communication network entities as they
house routers which definitely are communication network
entities. From the raw data we construct Implication Set(A)
and Implication Set(B), by following the rules stated below:
Rules: We consider that a PNE is dependent on a set of
CNEs for being in the active state (‘alive’) or being in the
6(a) Snapshot of Power Network in Maricopa County (b) Snapshot of Communication Network in Maricopa County
Fig. 2: Snapshots of power network and communication network in Maricopa County)
inactive state (‘dead’). Similarly, a CNE is dependent on a set
of PNEs for being active or inactive state. For simplicity we
consider the live equations with at most two minterms. For
the same reason we consider the size of each minterm is at
most two.
Generators (a1,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ p, where p is the total number
of generators): We consider that each generator (a1.i) is
dependent on the nearest Cell Tower (b1,j) or the nearest
Fiber-lit building (b2,k) and the corresponding Fiber link (b3,l)
connecting b2,k and a1,i. Thus, we have
a1,i ← b1,j + b2,k × b3,l
Load (a2,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ q, where q is the total number of loads):
We consider that the loads in the power network do not depend
on any CNE.
Transmission Lines (a3,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, where r is the total num-
ber of transmission lines): We consider that the transmission
lines do not depend on any CNE.
Cell Towers (b1,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ s, where s is the total number
of cell towers): We consider the cell towers depend on the
nearest pair of generators and the corresponding transmission
line connecting the generator to the cell tower. Thus, we have
b1,i ← a1,j × a3,k + a1,j′ × a3,k′
Fiber-lit Buildings (b2,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ t, where t is the total number
of fiber-lit buildings): We consider that the fiber-lit buildings
depend on the nearest pair of generators and the corresponding
transmission lines connecting the generators to the cell tower.
Thus, we have b2,i ← a1,j × a3,k + a1,j′ × a3,k′
Fiber Links (b3,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ u, where u is the total number of
fiber links)): We consider that the fiber links do not depend
on any PNE.
Because of experimental resource limitation, we have con-
sidered 5 regions of Maricopa County for our experiments.
We used IBM CPLEX Optimizer 12.5 to run the formulated
ILP’s on the experimental dataset. We show our results in
the figure 3. We observe that in each of the regions there
is a specific budget threshold beyond which each additional
increment in budget results in the death of only one entity. The
reason for this behavior is our assumption that entities such
as the transmission lines and the fiberlinks are not dependent
on any other entities. We notice that all the entities of the
two networks can be destroyed with a budget of about 60%
of the number of entities of the two networks A and B. Most
importantly, we find that the degree of vulnerability of all
the five regions considered in our study are close and no one
region stands out as being extremely vulnerable.
Fig. 3: Experimental results of failure vulnerability across five regions
of Maricopa county
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